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Positivism, New Haven Jurisprudence,
and the Fragmentation of International Law
Tai-Heng Cheng1
Abstract: This Article addresses the
fragmentation of international law and international
legal theory. This problem has become increasingly
acute. As international interactions have increased
exponentially among a broad range of domestic and
international actors, the need to coordinate and
regulate international actions has correspondingly
intensified. Because actors cannot seem to agree
on what international law is, consensus on
applicable international laws and legal behavior
often remains elusive. Using positivism and policyoriented jurisprudence – two major theories of
international law – as foci of inquiry, this Article
demonstrates that the gulf between the two
international legal theories are not really meaningful
conceptual disagreements. Instead, they are
differences about ontological and normative
commitments that are anterior to conceptualizing
about law, which this Article terms preconcept
commitments. After identifying the nature of
fragmentation between Positivism and policyoriented jurisprudence, the Article suggests that
these differences of preconcept commitments can be
bridged, or at least revealed, if jurists and policymakers clarify semantically what they mean when
they use the term law. This theoretical move may
enable jurists and policy-makers to engage each
other more meaningfully. By addressing the
fragmentation of international legal theory in this
manner, jurists and policy-makers may be able to
understand each other better and work together
more effectively to devise international laws and
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processes to prevent, address and rectify
international problems.
I.

Introduction

The fragmentation of international law and legal
theory is an age old issue that has vexed jurists, philosophers and
decision-makers in international problems. Although this problem
is not new, it is today magnified because of broader and deeper
international interactions that all require regulation, and which are
not fully coordinated in part because international law remains
fragmented. For centuries, there have been diverse viewpoints on
what international law is and how it works (and, relatedly, whether
international law even law and whether it works at all).2 However,
the problem of fragmentation has now become acute as different
conceptions of international law have proliferated and some have
become more entrenched.3
Without agreement on what
international law is, who it binds, and how it may control actions,
governments may identify and follow contradictory purported
international legal rules, national courts and international tribunals
may prescribe conflicting legal principles that lead to inconsistent
outcomes with potentially destructive consequences for world
order, and corporations and individuals may be left uncertain about
their legal protections in their international activities.
This Article proposes that fragmentation can begin
to be addressed by going behind each concept of international law
2

See HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE
FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992); MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER
AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008); ANNE MARIE
SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005); JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007);
MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS (2006); HANS KELSEN,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d. rev. ed.
1966); ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH & ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD,
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968); Hilary Charlesworth, Christine
Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to International Law,
85 AM. J. INT’L L. 613 (1991). For a good discussion of the major
theories of international law, see generally METHODS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (S. Ratner & A. Slaughter eds., 2004).
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See Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan M. Zasloff, Power and
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64, 64–65 (2006) (discussing
fragmentation of international law theory).
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to examine their respective preconcept commitments that may
divide international legal theories. It examines two leading and
apparently diametrically opposed theories: positivism, which views
law as a corpus of rules created largely by states and identified in
accord with sources of law, and policy-oriented jurisprudence,
which views law as a dynamic process of decision-making in
which rules might play only one part in determining the outcomes
in international problems. The Article suggests that although the
two theories are conceptually different and, in some senses,
incompatible, their differences are not meaningful conceptual
differences.4 Instead, the differences are actually disagreements
about preconcept commitments of a normative and ontological
nature that are anterior to conceptualizing about law. By
identifying pre-concept commitments, and adjusting semantics to
clarify what jurists respectively mean when they use the term
“law,” jurists may better engage each other – meaningfully
agreeing and disagreeing – to address international problems more
effectively, or at the very least, with less confusion. The Article
concludes by hypothesizing that differences among other
international legal theories may similarly be clarified by examining
their preconcept commitments, a process that could help
international actors understand and bridge their respective
perspectives on international law.
An entry point into the fragmentation of
international law vis-à-vis positivism and policy-oriented
jurisprudence is the criticism that proponents of the former have
made of the latter. Ever since the policy-oriented jurisprudence
was developed in the 1930s, positivists have criticized it for
apparently “conflating law, political science and politics plain and
simple.”5 Yet, policy-oriented lawyers have long participated in
4

There are of course many other important theories of international law.
See supra n. 2. Due to constraints of space, the theoretical moves
proposed in this Article will have to be tested against the other theories
in future scholarship. See generally TAI-HENG CHENG, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS COMMITMENT (forthcoming, Oxford University Press, 2010).
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Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals
for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 302, 305 (1999); see Oscar Schachter, Panel Remarks,
McDougal's Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy, (April 26,
1985) in 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 266, 267 (1985) [Hereinafter
McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence, Controversy] (“Above all,
the complaint charges that by subordinating law to policy, the McDougal
approach virtually dissolves the restraints of rules and opens the way for
partisan or subjective policies disguised as law.”).
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decision-making in international legal problems alongside
positivists,6 confounding attempts at unifying international law
behind one theoretical orientation.
Before positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence
can be reconciled to reduce the fragmentation of international law,
the positivist critique needs to be carefully examined and
addressed. This Article will unpack what key positivist criticisms
could be, how they might be justified, as well as addressed, and,
importantly, whether it is possible to find ways for positivists and
New Haven jurists to understand and engage each other even more
effectively.
There are at least three different but related versions
of the general critique that policy-oriented jurisprudence conflates
law, policy and politics.7 The first version is that policy-oriented
jurisprudence conflates law with politics. This essay will argue
that this claim is conceptually inaccurate because the policy
oriented concept of law explicitly excludes purely political
considerations. It is impossible to examine every past application
of policy oriented jurisprudence to determine conclusively whether

Law and Economics scholars tend also to adopt the positivist concept of
law as a system of rules, see generally JACK L. GOLDSMITH& ERIC
POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW parts I & II (2005);
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS CHS. 4 & 5
(2007), and have leveled similar criticisms of the New Haven School.
See Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, The Law and Economics of
Humanitarian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT’L L.
394, 408 (1999) (criticizing the “school’s failure to distinguish clearly
between law and politics,” and observing that “many leading New Haven
theorists have tended to merge law into policy.”).
6

See Methanex v. United States (NAFTA/UNCITRAL, Aug. 3, 2005),
slip op. (Arbitrators: V.V. Veeder; W. Michael Reisman, William
Rowley). Dame Rosalyn Higgins, the Former President of International
Court of Justice, and Judge Florentino Feliciano, the Chairman of the
Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization and President of the
Philippines Supreme Court, were both schooled in policy-oriented
jurisprudence. Policy-oriented jurisprudence has also been applied in
national courts. See, e.g., De Los Santos Mora v. N.Y., 524 F.3d 183,
190 n. 9 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied 2008 U.S Dist. LEXIS 7724 (Oct.
14, 2008); United States v. Corey, 232 F.3d 1166, 1177 (9th Cir. 2000);
Mortimer v. Fed. Rep. Germany, 1:05-cv-10669, Order Denying
Amendment (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2008), slip op. at 2.
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politics was injected into the mix. But even if it were possible, that
would not conclusively establish that policy oriented jurisprudence
as a conceptual matter conflates law with politics. Just as
positivists may apply politics to law in error without inserting
politics into the positivist concept of law, policy oriented jurists
could apply politics to law in error without injecting politics into
the policy oriented concept of law.
The second version of the critique is that the policy
oriented concept of law wrongly incorporates policy into law. This
criticism cannot be made by soft positivists, whose concept of law
accepts that criteria for legal validity could, but need not, include
policy or normative heuristics. The incorporation of policy as a
criterion for legal validity under the policy oriented concept of law
is therefore consistent with the soft positivist concept of law.
Hard positivists, whose concept of law excludes
normative considerations from the criteria for legal validity, can
make the second version of the critique described above. I will
argue that hard positivism does not accord with the semantic usage
of the term international law, or, in the alternative, does not accord
with a functional usage of the term.
The third version of the critique is that the extent to
which the policy oriented concept of law incorporates policy is
wrong, or at least different from the soft positivist concept of law.
Although soft positivists might agree with policy oriented jurists
that the concept of law could refer to normative criteria for
legality, soft positivists might charge that the policy oriented
concept gives excessive weight to policy, or is insufficiently
determinate in its application of policy.
A key intellectual task in policy oriented
jurisprudence is the clarification of standpoints. Undertaking this
task brings into focus points of agreement and disagreement about
whether the policy oriented concept of law excessively or
indeterminately incorporates policy into law. When the policy
oriented jurist serves as a judge, arbitrator, or counsel, in the
normal case, his references to policy in identifying and applying
the applicable laws tend to go only as far as permitted by the same
secondary legal rules that positivists apply.
When the policy oriented jurist steps into the role of
a legal scholar recommending alternative visions of what the law
could be, he is less constrained in imagining the law. The
scholarly application of the policy oriented concept of law appears
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incompatible with the positivist concept of law. Policy oriented
jurisprudence conceives of law as an authoritative and controlling
process of decision-making to maximize human dignity. Legal
rules do not matter solely because of their formal legal pedigree. It
also matters whether they are accompanied by expectations of
compliance, the extent to which they are in fact controlling, and
whether their prescriptions promote world values. Conversely,
practices without formal legal pedigree are relevant if they
institutionalize expectations of compliance and accord with human
dignity. In contrast, positivism conceives of law very differently.
At the risk of being overly reductive, at least for the moment, it
conceives of law as a body of rules derived
from secondary rules identifying formal legal sources.
I will argue that although the policy oriented and
positivist concepts of law are incompatible in this regard, this is
not a meaningful conceptual disagreement because the
disagreement arises from commitments of that are anterior to
conceptualizing law. These commitments, which I call preconcept commitments, in my view, are not of a conceptual nature.
They are instead commitments that are ontological, political,
normative,8 and/or semantic. Because of their different respective
pre-concept commitments, positivists and policy-oriented jurists
have undertaken different intellectual tasks concerning different
systems under their respective inquiries. Without agreement on
pre-concept commitments, it is difficult to have meaningful
conceptual disagreements.
The disagreements as to pre-concept commitments
are meaningful normative or political disagreements. From a
pragmatic point of view, however, it is mostly unnecessary to
resolve these disagreements. With an adjustment of semantics,
positivists and policy oriented jurists should be able to choose
either concept of law without causing confusion. They may even
subsequently accept renvoi to the other concept if the situation
requires.
I hope that this attempt to deepen our understanding
of the nature of the philosophical differences between positivists
and policy-oriented jurists may be a useful contribution to
8

“Normative” is used here in contrast to “descriptive” or “conceptual.”
See Jeremy Waldron, Normative (or Ethical) Positivism, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT 411, 411 (J. Coleman ed., 2001) [hereinafter HART’S
POSTSCRIPT] (discussing meanings of normativity and using normative in
the same sense as it is used here).
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scholarship because it begins to fill the interstices between
international legal theory and conceptual jurisprudence.
International law scholars are familiar with different concepts of
international law,9 but only a few international law scholars have
appraised international law theory through the lens of conceptual
jurisprudence.10 Legal philosophers have discussed the concept of
law, but many have not fully considered international law.11 There
is much work to be done in the philosophy of international law.12
Each version of the positivist critique is examined
below in turn.
II.

Does The New Haven Concept of Law Conflate Law
and Politics?

Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell began
working on the policy-oriented approach to law at Yale University
over sixty years ago.13 As the policy-oriented approach developed,
observers conferred upon it the alternate appellation, “the New
Haven School,” in recognition of its geographical and intellectual
locus and its worldwide epistemic community of adherents.

9

See MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-151 (2008); Richard H. Steinberg & Jonathan
M. Zasloff, Power and International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 64 (2006).

10

See DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
WORLD ORDER 120 (2008); Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of
Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International
Law, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 345 (1998) [hereinafter Kingsbury, The
Concept of Compliance].

11

See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 238-45 (2d
ed. 1986); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 71 (1986) (not discussing
international law); cf., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d
ed. 1997) [hereinafter HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW]. Although Hart
considers international law at length, international law has continued to
evolve since THE CONCEPT OF LAW was published.

12

Cf., Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance, supra note 10, at 368
(suggesting a research agenda on the philosophy of compliance in
international law).

13

See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Legal
Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L. J. 203 (1943).
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From its inception, the New Haven School has
provoked strong responses from positivists.14 This may have been
due in part to McDougal’s iconoclastic persona.15 But it was also
possibly due to perceptions that the New Haven concept of law
was diametrically opposed to the positivist concept of law.16
Generally speaking, positivists conceive of law as a
system of rules that regulate the conduct of those to whom the
rules address.17 Ulrich Fastenrath has explained that legal validity
in positivism is determined by “a law-creating process, without
affecting normative content.”18
14

See David J. Bederman, Appraising a Century of Scholarship in the
American Journal of International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 20, 41
(2006) (“So powerful was this new approach -- and generally
unprecedented and subversive -- that it naturally started to draw sharp
critiques.”).

15

See W. Michael Reisman, Theory About Law: Jurisprudence for a
Free Society, 108 Yale L. J. 935, 939 (1999) [hereinafter Reisman,
Theory About Law] (“McDougal's image . . . in the collective mind of the
academy and the profession [was that of an] enfant terrible and destroyer
of the law.”).

16

See Harold Hongju Koh, Is there a “New” New Haven School of
International Law?, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 559, 561 (2007) (“The New
Haven School expressly intended to criticize both legal formalism and
legal positivism in international law.”); Rosalyn Higgins, Diverging
Anglo-American Attitudes to International Law: Introductory Statement,
2 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1972) (recording Rosalyn Higgin’s
observations about skepticism of British scholars towards mixing policy
with legal rules); Julien Cantegreil, Legal Formalism Meets PolicyOriented Jurisprudence: A More European Approach to Frame the War
on Terror, 60 ME. L. REV. 97, 99 (2008) (noting that the policy-oriented
approach is “diametrically opposed to the Kelsenian spirit”).

17

See Simma & Paulus, supra note 5, at 304 (“Law is regarded as a
unified system of rules[.]”); Ulrich Fastenrath, Relative Normativity in
International Law, 4 EUR. J. INT’L L. 305, 307 (1993) (“Legal positivism
identifies law with legal propositions (Rechtssätze), i.e., the wording of
positive rules[.]”).

18

Fastenrath, supra note 17, at 307. Fastenrath’s exposition seems a
little simplistic, because it does not account for the soft positivist
conception of law; see infra, Part II; see also generally, Benedict
Kingsbury, Legal Positivism as Normative Politics: International
Society, Balance of Power and Lassa Oppenheim’s Positive
International Law, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 401 (2002) (explaining normative
positivism).
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In contrast, the New Haven School conceives of law
as a global process of authoritative and controlling decisionmaking to address international problems and to maximize human
dignity.19 Normative concerns are explicitly considered and
included in the criteria for legal validity.
Consequently, the New Haven concept of law has
appeared to be incompatible with positivism. Some critics have
charged that the New Haven concept of law distorts law with
politics.20 Others have even gone so far as to charge that the New
Haven School served U.S. foreign policy interests.21
In the author’s view, the charge that the New Haven
concept of law confuses politics with law is conceptually
inaccurate, because the School explicitly distinguishes policy from
politics. To explain this point, a somewhat lengthy exposition of
the New Haven concept of law is necessary.
It is a Herculean task to summarize the New Haven
approach. In 1992, McDougal and Lasswell, working with
Andrew Willard, took over 1,500 pages to set out the New Haven
approach after decades of developing it.22 Professor W. Michael
Reisman, the leading contemporary scholar from the New Haven
School, and his associates have continued to apply and refine the

19

See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Williard, Policy-Oriented
Jurisprudence & Human Rights Abuse in Internal Conflict: Toward a
World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 316, 319
(1999) (“First, law is conceived of as an ongoing process of authoritative
and controlling decision.”).

20

See supra note 5.

21

Hari M. Osofsky, A Law and Geography Perspective on the New
Haven School, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 424 (2007) (“The School has
been accused of . . . serving as apologists for U.S. foreign policy.”);
O’CONNELL, supra note 9, at 70 (“The harsher criticism of the New
Haven School was aimed at McDougal’s evident promotion of United
States policy.”); Reisman, Theory About Law, supra note 15, at 939
(noting that critics have accused policy-oriented jurisprudence of
promoting American values).

22

MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & HAROLD LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A
FREE SOCIETY (1992).
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approach.23 Nonetheless, bearing in mind Reisman’s admonition
that the scholar is the “ultimate instrument of perception and
appraisal,”24 an attempt will be made here to describe the features
of the New Haven concept of law salient to the present
discussion.25
The New Haven School is principally interested in
guiding decision-makers about how to act in an international
problem or situation. It is less interested in only identifying and
applying rules that the world community might ordinarily term
“laws.”26 Thus, the New Haven School conceives of law not just
as a body of laws identified by reference to past decisions (whether
judicial, legislative, executive) that have been designated by a
secondary rule of identification as a law. Law is instead conceived
of as an authoritative and controlling process of decision-making
to address problems and secure maximum human dignity. This
formulation might seem inaccessible to lawyers unfamiliar with
New Haven syntax and vocabulary,27 so each element is explained
in turn below.
In its ordinary semantic usage, “laws” often refer to
rules, commands or prescriptions that have been designated as
23

See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Testing a Theory About Law,
WISSENSCHAFTSKOLLEG 104, 104 (Jahrbuch, 1989/90) [hereinafter
Testing a Theory About Law]; Wiessner & Willard, supra note 19, at
316; Cantegreil, supra note 16, at 99; Osofsky, supra note 21, at 422-26.

24

W. Michael Reisman, Preface in DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD ORDER vii, vii (2008)
[hereinafter JOHNSTON Preface].

25

For other expositions of the New Haven concept of law, see
JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 115-18; Cantegreil, supra note 16, at 99.

26

Eisuke Suzuki, The New Haven School of International Law: An
Invitation to Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence, 1 YALE STUD. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 1, 30 (1974) (“[I]nternational law is most realistically observed, not
as a mere rigid set of rules, but as the whole process of authoritative
decision in which patterns of authority and patterns of control are
appropriately conjoined.”).

27

See Burns H. Weston, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence,
Controversy, supra note 5, at 266 (noting that some audiences find New
Haven vocabulary inaccessible). The author intentionally describes the
New Haven conceptualization prosaically in an effort to address this
criticism.
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“legal” because they have been identified in the past in a court or
legislature or executive decision. In the international context, a
past decision includes accepted sources and secondary rules of
identification, such as treaties.28
To the New Haven scholar, however, the
identification of a law according to predetermined secondary rules
fails to provide adequate guidance to relevant actors about
appropriate conduct. The actor will want to know how the rule is
communicated, to whom, and with what effect. The actor will also
want to know whether the rule reflects his interests and, whether it
is good policy. To the extent that the actor’s interests deviate from
good policies for the community at large, the New Haven scholar
may take an external perspective and try to persuade the actor to
set aside its parochial interests in favor of shared world values.29
Because identifying a rule as a law through past decisions could
obscure the intellectual tasks described here, the New Haven
School resists characterizing rules, standing alone, as law.
An example might make this point clearer. The
New Haven scholar would accept that the Genocide Convention
contains rules prohibiting genocide,30 as defined under the
convention.31 But the New Haven scholar would not stop there in
studying the international legal system. He would want to know
how the Genocide Convention is communicated to potential and
actual genocidal regimes and with what effect. He would want to
know when and why genocide occurs and when it does not. He
would study prior incidents in which genocide took place,
genocide was prevented, or genocide was stopped. Based on the
information he collects, the New Haven scholar would make
recommendations to relevant actors, including state officials,
courts,
and
non-governmental
organizations.
These
28

See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055; cf., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 3 (1994) (“[R]ules are just
accumulated past decisions.”).

29

For an excellent discussion of how legal advisors should, and in fact
do, balance the interests of their government with broader ethical and
policy concerns, see JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 66-70.

30

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.

31

Id. at art. 2.
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recommendations are intended to coordinate their strategies in an
authoritative and controlling fashion to prevent genocide from
occurring, to stop it when it occurs, and to take remedial actions to
ameliorate its consequences. The New Haven scholar is concerned
with the entire process in which relevant actors, such as states,
officials, courts, non-governmental organizations, international
organizations, and corporations communicate past decisions to
each other about the issue at hand; how they interact and address
problems; and how good outcomes may be secured in the present
and future.
To count as law, as opposed to random or unlawful
processes, the process of interaction must be authoritative and
controlling. By “authority,” the New Haven School means
“expectations of appropriate conduct” at each stage of the process
in which problems are addressed.32 These expectations come from
a combination of factors. Each of these factors can be explained
and illustrated with a hypothetical arbitration between two states
concerning sovereignty over a disputed territory. 33
The first factor is whether the decision-maker has
been properly endowed with decision-making power, such as an
arbitrator selected by two states to resolve their dispute over
whether a disputed territory should be restored to one or the other
state.34
The second factor is whether the decision-maker is
pursuing proper objectives, such as the reduction of conflict, rather
than unacceptable personal goals, such as the pursuit of bribes.35
32

Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, The
World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 253, 256 (1966).

33

Although this example is constructed hypothetically, Professor
Reisman has served as arbitrator and as counsel in at least two actual
territorial disputes. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission Decision
(Eri. v. Eth.) (Apr. 13, 2000), slip op.; Case Concerning Land
Reclamation by Singapore in and Around the Straits of Johor (Malay. v.
Sing.), Request for Provisional Measures, ITLOS/PV.03/05 (Int’l Trib.
For the Law of the Sea, Sept. 27, 2003) Hearing Tr. 28:16-33:27.

34

See W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism
in ICSID Arbitration, 1989 DUKE L.J. 739, 745 (1989).
35
See generally, Jason N. Summerfield, The Corruption Defense in
Investment Disputes, 6:1 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. (Mar. 2009)
(appraising corruption in arbitration from a New Haven perspective).
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The third factor is whether the decision supports
relevant world values. So, an arbitral award that purports to
authorize a state to recapture the invaded territory through any
means, including genocide, would be unlawful. This is because
permitting genocide is bad policy, and strong international
decisions have been made, in the form of the Genocide Convention
and analogous jus cogens, to reject this policy.
The fourth factor is whether the decision was made
in a proper physical, temporal and institutional context.
Continuing our arbitration example, this includes requirements that
the arbitral award should be rendered after a hearing, while the
dispute is still alive and of a legal nature, and in accord with the
rules of the arbitration center designed by the arbitration
agreement.36
By “controlling,” the New Haven School means
decisions and processes that actually direct outcomes. Whereas
“authority” has normative and factual elements, “control” is purely
a question of fact. So, an arbitral award is controlling if it causes
the disputing states to follow the decision, or to oppose it in ways
that were contemplated in advance as acceptable and appropriate,
such as by challenging enforcement in a national court, seeking
annulment before a review committee, or settling the dispute.
If law is a process of authoritative and controlling
decisions, is a decision that is authoritative but not controlling still
law? In the arbitration example, if the award is effectively ignored
by the losing party, is it still law? The New Haven School would
resist designating the award as not law simply because it is not
controlling for a period of time. Few international processes are
fully authoritative and fully controlling. Law is not a binary
concept in which the process is most usefully designated as either
lawful or not lawful.37 There can be shades of grey in an
international process that addresses problems. Depending on how
authoritative and controlling it is, it may be more or less like law.
Because law is seen as the entire process of decision-making, the
New Haven School would not necessarily characterize the ignored
award as not law in the first instance. Instead, it would focus on
36

See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 32, at 266 (making
the same points).

37

Cf. Tai-Heng Cheng, The Central Case Approach to Human Rights, 13
PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 257 (2004) (rejecting binary approach to human
rights in favor of a central case approach).
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whether and how the award could be implemented in the face of a
losing party that seems, at least for the moment, intent on and able
to ignore the award.
If, however, the award were never complied with,
and indeed a majority of the awards rendered under the arbitral
institution are effectively ignored over a significant time period,
the New Haven School might explain that although the arbitral
institution and awards had the formal appearance of law, in
substance they had ceased to function as law because of the utter
lack of control. Over time, the awards may not even be
authoritative in the sense that parties in arbitration may not have
any expectation that the appropriate conduct is to comply with the
award. If it became the situation that most arbitrations under the
arbitral institution were reduced to kabuki, New Haven scholars
might characterize the arbitration proceedings as a “myth system”
in which awards were rendered and supposedly “lawful” in the
ordinary semantic usage of that word. This myth system would
exist alongside an “operational code” in which the world
community understands that the award would be effectively
ignored. From the functional New Haven perspective, an ignored
award from an arbitral institution that is broken could not be
considered law even if it is designated as such by formal sources.38
An international decision that is controlling but not
authoritative may also seem less like law. At the extreme, if a
decision is made with such power that it controls outcomes, but is
otherwise not authoritative, that decision may not be lawful. So a
rogue state, or a powerful state (take your pick), that uses
conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction
unprovoked, or under an artificial fig leaf of self-defense, may well
control at least one outcome – the destruction of the state attacked.
But the act of aggression would not be lawful. From the New
Haven perspective, the designation of the act as unlawful is
insufficient. The New Haven scholar is interested in also making
recommendations to relevant actors in the global community to
respond in an appropriate process to restore world order.

38

See generally W. Michael Reisman, Myth System and Operational
Code, 3 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 229 (1976-1977). Reisman’s
separation of law into a myth system and operational code may be
conceptually incompatible with some forms of positivism, because it can
be accommodated within a sophisticated rendering of the rule of
recognition that allows the community to distinguish between rhetorical
claims and actual prescriptions that are followed.
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There is one more element of the New Haven
concept of law that needs explanation. The ideas of authority and
law are intrinsically entwined with the goal to which the process of
law is directed. The New Haven School has designated the
promotion of human dignity to be the preeminent goal. The
normativity of law comes in part from the values it promotes.
These values are designated in short hand form by the phrase,
“human dignity.” This capacious term includes values such as
affection, respect and well-being.39 At its margins, scholars may
debate whether a value is intrinsic to human dignity, such as an
overly expansive or idiosyncratic notion of democracy. But there
are clear instances in which an otherwise authoritative and
controlling decision would not be law because the decision is
abhorrent to human dignity. If an award purported to authorize a
state to commit genocide as a self-help measure to reclaim its
territory, the award would not be regarded as lawful. Its lawless
nature would not be due only to the Genocide Convention and jus
cogens prohibiting genocide. It would also be due to the selfevident policy against genocide.
In summary, the New Haven School conceives of
law not just as a static body of rules, but as an authoritative and
controlling process through which social ends are constantly
negotiated, adjusted and secured.40 The New Haven concept is
part descriptive, for it describes the international process involved
in preventing and resolving international problems. It is in part
normative, for it identifies social goals to not only direct the
process but also to serve as a heuristic for the legality of the
process. It is also in part prescriptive, because it makes
recommendations to a wide range of decision-makers about
appropriate actions and responses. But, perhaps ironically to some
observers, it is not dogmatic. As an instrumentalist conception of
law, it is open to making recommendations to decision-makers to
use whatever tools are necessary or legitimate to achieve the social
goals. These tools include, but are not necessarily limited to, legal
rules.
39

MCDOUGAL & LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 22, at 375-590.

40

See Harold Hongju Koh, A World Transformed, 20 YALE J. INT’L L.
ix, xii-xiii (1995) (explaining that the New Haven School seeks to
“Develop a functional critique of international law in terms of social
ends . . . that shall conceive of the legal order as process and not as a
condition.” (quoting Roscoe Pound, Philosophical Theory and
International Law, 1 BIBLIOTHECA VISSERIANA 73, 89 (1932))).
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Nothing in the foregoing exposition of the New
Haven concept of law incorporates politics into the criteria for law.
Yet, critics have contended that “policy” functions as a code word
for “politics.”41 Perceptions that McDougal used the New Haven
concept of law to advance American interests may have fueled this
suspicion.42
Space constraints here make it impossible to
determine whether each of McDougal’s interventions injected
politics into law, or whether they simply reflected the promotion of
universal human values.43 In any event, such an exercise would
not get us very far in determining whether the New Haven concept
of law conflates law with policy. Just as positivists may
legitimately disagree with each other about the correct application
of a rule to facts without necessarily indicating that the positivist
concept of law conflates interests with rules, New Haven jurists
may take controversial positions in an international problem
without necessarily indicating that the New Haven concept of law
folds law into politics. Even if in a particular problem a New
Haven jurist incorporated law into politics, that may simply be a
misapplication of the New Haven concept of law, just as positivists
may apply a wrong rule of law without undermining the concept of
law itself.
Any appraisal of the New Haven concept of law
should not be transfixed on its applications to problems that
occurred decades ago. In historical and contemporary applications,
New Haven jurists have taken positions contrary to prevailing U.S.
national policies or interests.44 Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq
41

See JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 121 (attributing this view to Richard
Falk).

42

Id. at 119 (“McDougal himself was seen as an unabashed advocate of
US foreign policy.”); Edward McWhinney, Book Review, 87 AM. J.
INT’L L. 335, 338-9 (1993) (reviewing HAROLD D. LASWELL & MYRES
S. MCDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY (1992)).

43

Reisman, Theory About Law, supra note 15, at 939 (noting Eisuke
Suziki’s argument that the commitment to human dignity, which is core
to New Haven jurisprudence, was a universal value, not an American
value).

44

See Rosalyn Higgins, The Benign First Mate, in LAW IN THE SERVICE
OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 11
(S. Charnovitz et al. eds. 2005) [hereinafter FELICIANO FESTSCHRIFT]
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in 2003, Reisman devoted his speech accepting the American
Society of International Law’s Manley O. Hudson medal – its
highest honor – to a careful critique of regime change. He
concluded:
[L]et the strongest and bestintentioned
government
contemplating or being pressed to
undertake regime change remember
that not everything noble is lawful;
not everything noble and lawful is
feasible; and not everything noble,
lawful, and feasible is wise.45
In response to the Bush doctrine of preemptive force, Reisman
wrote a Centennial Essay in the American Journal of International
Law warning that the Bush doctrine could pose a threat to world
order, because it encouraged other states to claim similar
preemptive rights.46 These appraisals contradict the claim that
New Haven jurisprudence blindly promotes U.S. foreign policies.
Further, Reisman’s scholarship explicitly disavows
not just biases towards U.S. interests, but the injection of politics
into the New Haven concept of law. In JURISPRUDENCE, he wrote:
A . . . point of importance is the
need to observe yourself as the
instrument of observation and
(“Feliciano’s life in the law is a silent rebuttal to those who contend that
a policy-oriented approach to law is but a façade for politics, . . . .”); TaiHeng Cheng, Power and Authority in International Investment Law, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 465, 508-512 (2005) (criticizing the Loewen award
for refusing to find jurisdiction over NAFTA dispute arising from lack of
due process in Mississippi courts); Julien Cantegreil, The Final Award in
Mondev International v. United States of America, in THE REASONS
REQUIREMENT IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 33, 50-57
(M. Reisman & G.A. Alverez eds. 2008) [hereinafter THE REASONS
REQUIREMENT] (criticizing the Mondev Award for finding in favor of the
United States based on inadequate reasoning).
45

W. Michael Reisman, The Manley O. Hudson Lecture: Why Regime
Change Is (Almost Always) A Bad Idea, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 516, 525
(2004).
46
See generally W. Michael Reisman & Andrea Armstrong, The Past
and Future of the Claim of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.
525 (2006).
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choice.
. . . [T]he responsible
decisionmaker or appraiser should
develop methods of scrutinizing the
self-system and determining the
extent
to
which
emotional
tendencies, sub-group parochialisms
or institutional biases are distorting
or skewing observation and choice.47
Thus, whatever the truth or falsity of the factual claim that some
appliers of the New Haven jurisprudence might have injected
politics into their appraisals (just as scholars and advocates using
any concept of law may do so intentionally or inadvertently), the
New Haven concept of law does not incorporate partisan politics as
a criteria for policy choices and legal validity.
III.

Does the New Haven Concept of Law Wrongly Conflate
Law and Policy?

The second version of the positivist critique of the
New Haven concept of law is that it wrongly conflates law and
policy. Soft positivists, who accept that legal validity can have
normative or policy criteria, cannot make this criticism. Hard
positivists, however, can make this criticism. They contend that
the concept of law cannot admit normative criteria for legal
validity, which must be confined to social facts. Yet, if this is true,
this hard positivist critique of the New Haven concept of law
applies with equal force to their critique of soft positivists. The
incorporation of policy content into law would not be a unique
failing of New Haven jurisprudence. In any event, the hard
positivist concept of law does not accord with the ordinary
understanding of the term international law and how it functions.
An excursion into positivism will help explain these
points. It is perhaps an impossible task to adequately convey the
sophistication of positivism here, but nonetheless an attempt will
be made.
Positivism as a legal philosophy provides the
conceptual framework for positivism in international law. The key
intellectual goal of positivism, according to its preeminent
philosophers, H.L.A. Hart and Hans Kelsen, is to describe the
47

W. MICHAEL REISMAN & AARON M. SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE:
UNDERSTANDING AND SHAPING LAW 13 (1987) [hereinafter REISMAN &
SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE].
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concept of law by reference to a central case or ideal type legal
system.48 This descriptive enterprise is “morally neutral and has
no justifactory aims.”49 Hart’s ideal type was domestic legal
orders, in particular England. Kelsen’s ideal types were positive
laws from domestic legal orders, such as the United States or
France, or, importantly for international law positivists,
international law. Regardless of the legal system, Kelsen included
within his field of inquiry only “positive law.”50
At its core, positivism conceives of law as a body of
rules identified as laws by reference to past decisions
acknowledged as providing the rules with legal pedigree. Law is
therefore a social fact.51 Kelsen conceptualized his “pure theory of
law” as a body of rules ultimately emanating from a grundnorm, or
basic validating norm, such as the very first constitution in a legal
order.52
For many Anglo-American legal philosophers, Hart
developed an enduring version of positivism. According to Hart, a
legal system exists if two social facts exist. First, officials accept
48

See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 239 (stating that
THE CONCEPT OF LAW “seeks to give an explanatory and clarifying
account of law as a complex social and political institution with a rulegoverned (and in that sense “normative”) aspect”); id. at 100 (focusing
on “the salient features of a modern municipal legal system”).

49

See HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 240 (“My account
is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims: it
does not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms
and structures which appear in my general account of law[.]”); HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE xiii (A.Wedberg trans.,
1945), reprinted in REISMAN & SCHREIBER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note
47 at 381 (1987) (“the aim of this general theory of law is to enable the
jurist concerned with a particular legal order . . . to understand and
describe as exactly as possible his own positive law.”).

50

KELSEN, supra note 49, at xiii-xviii (“[T]he pure theory of law seeks
to attain its results exclusively from an analysis of positive law.”).

51

In an earlier version of positivism, Austin stated: “Laws proper, or
properly so called, are commands; laws which are not commands, are
laws improper or improperly so called.” JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE
OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 1-3 (1832). But see HART, THE
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 79 (criticizing Austin’s concept of
law for failing to distinguish law from orders issued at gunpoint).

52

KELSEN, supra note 49, at xiii-xviii, 110-36, 175.
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secondary rules, the most important of which is a second rule of
recognition, prescribing the validity of primary rules. Second,
there is a general acceptance by the community, to whom rules are
addressed, of primary rules identified as valid by secondary rules
and the rule of recognition.53 The rule of recognition is a social
rule or custom constituted by a regular pattern of conduct and by a
“distinctive normative attitude” accepting the rule of recognition.
This normative attitude is the rule of recognition’s “internal
aspect.”54
After Ronald Dworkin launched a stinging attack on
Hart’s concept of law,55 Hart clarified in his postscript to THE
CONCEPT OF LAW that he did not exclude from his
conceptualization of law the possibility that a rule of recognition
could, although it need not, prescribe moral or normative criteria
(or, in New Haven speak, policy criteria) for the validity of
primary rules. This version of positivism has become know as
soft, or inclusive, positivism.56 Soft positivism contrasts against
hard, or exclusive, positivism. Joseph Raz, perhaps the leading
hard positivist, argues that a conceptualization of law cannot
include policy or moral criteria for the validity of law, because that
would undermine law’s unique claim to authority and render it
contingent upon morality.57
Positivists in international law share some key
postulates with their cousins in legal philosophy. The function of
their conceptualization of law is to identify laws. Unlike New
Haven jurists, positivists see their conceptual function as “not to
53

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 100-23; see also
Stephen Perry, Hart’s Methodological Positivism, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 319.

54

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 56.

55

See DWORKIN, supra note 11 at 45-46.

56

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 250-54; see Jules
Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139
(1982).

57

See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW
AND MORALITY (1979); see also Jules Coleman, Incorporationism,
Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT 99, 102, Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and
the Limits of Conceptual Analysis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT 355, 355 (both
discussing hard and soft positivism).
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facilitate the decision-makers dilemma between law and politics
(and, occasionally, law and morals), but to clarify the legal side of
things.”58 Their ideal type of international law is the rules or
norms governing international relations. Prosper Weil has asserted
that “the aggregate of the legal norms governing international
relations” is “as an uncontroversial starting point.”59
Arising from their observation of this ideal type,
Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus have stated that all
international law positivists are committed to the conceptualization
of law in the following terms:
Law is regarded as a unified system
of rules that, according to most
variants, emanate from state will.
This system of rules is an “objective”
reality and needs to be distinguished
from law “as it should be.”60
In the language of legal philosophy, international law positivists
accept, as do their jurisprudence counterparts, what Brian Leiter
has termed the Separation Thesis (what law is and what law ought
to be are separate questions), and the Social Thesis (what counts as
law is fundamentally a question of social fact).61
Where “classical” and “modern” positivists part
company is in their criteria for validity of international laws.
Simma and Paulus explain that
classical
positivism
demands
rigorous tests for legal validity.
Extralegal
arguments,
e.g.,
arguments that have no textual,
systemic or historical basis, are
deemed irrelevant to legal analysis;
there is only hard law, no soft law.62
58

Simma & Paulus, supra note 5, at 307.
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77
AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 413 (1983).

59

60

Simma & Paulus, supra note 5, at 304.

61

Leiter, supra note 57, at 358.

62

Simma & Paulus, supra note 5, at 304.
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Their insistence on a precise rule of recognition could necessitate,
or at least explain, classical international law positivists’ rejection
of normative or policy criteria for legal validity. Ambiguities in
normative criteria would render the rule of recognition uncertain
and undermine the concept of law as social fact. In general
jurisprudence, this is Dworkin’s Conventionality Thesis.63 Brigitte
Stern additionally echos Raz’s argument that law’s distinctive
authority or normatively must be internally defined without
reference to external values and policies.64
In comparison, modern international law positivists
seem more like soft positivists. They acknowledge that “soft law”
may be a sort of law even though their criteria for validity is more
open textured.65 They also appear to accept the introduction of
policy as long as it is prescribed as a relevant consideration by a
law. Simma and Paulus state that in circumstances where there
does not appear to be only one correct legal answer, the positivist
may derive a legal answer by injecting his “ethical standpoint,” for
instance through the application of “general principles of law,” or
in so far as “global values . . . find sufficient expression in legal
form.”66
The critique that the New Haven concept of law
improperly incorporates policy as a criterion for legal validity is
not one that can be made by positivists of all stripes. Because soft
positivists and “modern” international law positivists accept that
legal validity could turn on more than just social facts, the
63

DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 114-150; see also Coleman,
Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis,
supra note 57, at 99, 102 (noting that Dworkin’s reason for excluding
moral criteria is that such criteria are uncertain and undermine law’s
conventionality).
64
Brigitte Stern, Custom at the Heart of International Law, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 89, 93-94 (2001) (refusing to “refer to an extra-legal
element justifying the passage from fact into law in the customary
phenomenon as an approach which is foreign to a veritable legal science”
and concluding “law is nothing but a particular factual modality, a legal
order that can define itself as a factual order considered as law, without
anything needing to be added to this definition.”).
65

Simma & Paulus, supra note 5, at 306.

66

Id. at 316. See Wiessner & Willard, supra note 19; see also, HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 11, at 304; JOHNSTON, supra note 10
(citing the soft positivist Hart in support of their conception of classical
positivism).
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references of the New Haven School to policy in determining
appropriate laws is compatible with the soft positivist’s concept of
law.
Hard positivists and “classical” international law
positivists could, and indeed must, criticize the New Haven
concept of law as wrongly incorporating policy into the criteria for
legal validity. Raz is thoroughly rigorous in arguing that law
which is contingent on morality or – in the closely-related New
Haven vernacular, policy – does not have unique legal authority.
Nonetheless, there may be some doubt as to whether law that turns
on policy could be both normatively and legally authoritative. But
that is a longer debate for another essay.
My response here is narrower. Hard positivism
may not sit comfortably with international law for at least two
other reasons.
The first reason turns on the semantic usage of the
term. The author is not committed to this argument for reasons
that will become apparent in Part IV of this essay. Nonetheless, he
will make it for those who are committed to the value of semantics.
The term “international law” in its ordinary semantic usage among
international law professionals is often applied to determine the
legality of conduct at least in part by normative, moral or policy
criteria. For example, customary international law and countless
bilateral investment treaties often require host states to accord
foreign investments “fair and equitable treatment.” Numerous
arbitral awards have confirmed that this standard includes
normative criteria such as “legitimate expectations,” and policy
criteria, such as whether, in fact-specific contexts, the conduct of
the host state promotes business stability and foreign
investments.67 An UNCTAD report states that “meaning of [the
fair and equitable standard] has not been precisely defined.”68
Under the hard positivist concept of law, the fair and equitable
treatment standard could not be law, because the reference to
policy is inherently controversial, so it undermines clarity in the
law and Dworkin’s Conventionality Thesis. Yet, international
67

See Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM J. INT’L L. 1014, 1031-37 (2007) (discussing
the fair and equitable treatment standard).

68

See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”),
Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, at 53, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N. Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998).
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lawyers, scholars and arbitrators all regard the fair and equitable
treatment standard as law. Put another way, the term “international
law” includes, as a matter of common usage, imprecise legal rules
and standards that contain policy and normative content as
essential components. To the extent that conceptual jurisprudence
is meant to explain international law as the term is ordinarily used,
the inclusion of laws with ambiguous normative and policy criteria
within the term international law poses difficulties for the hard
positivist’ account of international law.
There is a second related, but distinct reason, for
doubting the hard positivist concept of law as applied to
international law. If a purpose of conceptual jurisprudence is to
explain the phenomenon of law and how it makes a practical
difference “in the structure and content of deliberation and
action,”69 then a concept of law must account for laws that can and
do affect how relevant actors think and behave. Returning to the
example of the fair and equitable treatment standard, it is beyond
doubt that host states and investors regard the fair and equitable
treatment standard as functioning as law. They have spent millions
of dollars in legal fees disputing whether the standard was
breached in investment disputes, and host states have honored
awards finding breaches of the standard. Because inherently
ambiguous and normative international legal rules have affected
behavior and decision-making in profound ways, it behooves
jurists to conceive of law in a way that accounts for such rules.
IV.

Does the New Haven Concept of Law Meaningfully
Differ from Soft Positivism About How and to What
Extent Policy is Incorporated into Law?

Although soft positivists cannot object to the
incorporation of policy per se into the New Haven concept of law,
they can object to the manner and extent that policy is
incorporated. While it is conceptually possible for the rule of
recognition to refer to normative or policy criteria for validity, soft
positivists may charge that the rule of recognition under the New
Haven concept of law contains wrong policy criteria or excessively
favors policy criteria.
Two contrasting examples clarify this point. A
modern international law positivist might accept renvoi to policy
69

Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical
Difference Thesis, supra note 57, at 101 (describing this as the practical
difference thesis).
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considerations where a legal rule explicitly contains policy
considerations, such as the rule requiring host states to accord
foreign investors fair and equitable treatment. If a New Haven
jurist referred to the policy of promoting foreign investments in
determining if a host state was fair and equitable, the soft positivist
would not quarrel with this application of the New Haven concept
of law.
In contrast, the modern international law positivist
would not accept renvoi to policy considerations without reference
to a legal rule that incorporates normative or policy criteria for
legality. Consider Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter, which
prohibit the use of military force except against an armed attack.
In addressing the question of whether these articles prohibit
preemptive military force against a putative enemy, which may
acquire the capability to launch a devastating attack in the future, a
soft positivist would be constrained by the plain and ordinary
language of the Articles in light of the object and purpose of the
UN Charter, as required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties of 1969. The soft positivist may also
consider subsequent state practices on the use of force to interpret
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter, as mandated by Article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention. But the soft positivist would not
countenance determining the meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51, or
more broadly, the legality of preemptive force, by appraising
policy concerns thoroughly divorced from canons of treaty
interpretation.
Imagine if a New Haven jurist interpreted Articles
2(4) and 51 without referring to formal rules of treaty
interpretation, but instead turned to relevant world policies, such as
the protection of human lives, the maintenance of world order, and
the potential for abuse in unilateral assessments of future risk. A
soft positivist may well charge that the New Haven concept of law
incorporated policy in a mistaken manner because it did not
identify any secondary rule permitting such references to policy.
The charge that the New Haven concept of law
incorporates policy into law differently than soft positivism is only
partially correct. An intellectual task of the New Haven School is
the clarification of standpoint. The manner in which one discerns
international law is guided by one’s role and standpoint. From
several of these standpoints, the application of New Haven concept
of law is practically similar in some ways similar to positivism.

25

© Tai-Heng Cheng. Draft of August 20, 2009.
Do Not Cite or Circulate.
As a judge or arbitrator, the New Haven jurist is
concerned about reaching a normatively desirable outcome, but, he
is also constrained by formal secondary rules guiding the
interpretation of laws and their application to facts to reach judicial
decisions.70 There are strong policy reasons for this practice. It is
good policy to generally follow a method of legal reasoning
accepted as legitimate by the community, and the applicable
primary and secondary rules often secure relevant community
values.71 Thus, Reisman has written that when deciding arbitral
disputes, “identification of the major principle and a pellucid
logical exercise would appear to be a minimum requirement.”72
This reliance on secondary rules to derive applicable laws and their
logical application to relevant facts is aligned with positivism,73
even if the New Haven School and positivists discharge their
respective judging duties in this manner for different reasons.
However, in other circumstances where applying
prior judicial decisions to novel circumstances would lead to
manifestly absurd results, “an adaptation or even an innovation in
policy” is required. Here, “a purported exercise in logical
derivation, far from explaining what is being done, can only
conceal what is being done.”74 This rejection of the apparently
70

For a detailed discussion of judging from the New Haven perspective,
see W. Michael Reisman, A Judge’s Judge: Florentino P. Feliciano’s
Philosophy of the Judicial Function, in LAW IN THE SERVICE OF
HUMANITY DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF FLORENTINO FELICIANO 3,
3-10 (S. Charnovitz ed. 2005).

71

See id. at 7. Reisman has explained his decisions in accord with these
two policies. See, e.g., Dispute Concerning ACCESS TO INFORMATION
UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE OSPAR CONVENTION (Ir. v. UK), Final
Award (OSPAR Arb. Trib. July 2, 2003) slip op. at 61, Decl. of W.
Michael Reisman, available at http://www.pca-cpa.org. (proposing
“plain reading of [a treaty provision because it] appears to both reflect its
objects and purposes and to produce a reasonable economic means for
implementing [the obligations in the provision].”) (emphasis added).

72

W. Michael Reisman & Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez, How Well are
Investment Awards Reasoned, in THE REASONS REQUIREMENT, supra
note 44, at 1, 31.

73

See, e.g., Dispute Concerning ACCESS TO INFORMATION UNDER
ARTICLE 9 OF THE OSPAR CONVENTION (Ir. v. UK), Final Award
(OSPAR Arb. Trib. July 2, 2003), Decl. of W. Michael Reisman,
available at http://www.pca-cpa.org.

74

Id.
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applicable secondary rules to determine laws and legal outcomes
may seem to depart from positivism, and may provoke claims that
the New Haven concept of law overly infuses law with policy.
It may come as a surprise that Dworkin takes
roughly the same position as the New Haven School on this issue.
Dworkin explains that Conventionalism does permit a court to
depart from binding precedent where the prior decision was
“especially immoral,” such as where the U.S. Supreme Court in
Brown v. Board of Education departed from Plessy v. Ferguson,
which had held that racial segregation did not violate the Equal
Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. Conventionalists would
insist that in such a case, “the Court should have made plain to the
public the exceptional nature of its decision, that it should have
admitted it was changing the law for non-legal reasons.”75 This is
similar to Reisman’s suggestion that where prior decisions would
lead to grossly suboptimal outcomes in contemporary contexts, a
judicial decision to reach a different outcome is permissible but
should be explained in policy terms rather than in seemingly
logical extensions of prior decisions.
From a scholarly standpoint, the New Haven School
and positivism do part ways. As a scholar, the New Haven jurist is
unfettered by judicial constraints. The scholar may imagine
alternative visions of law that better promote relevant policies and
social goals, and recommend to decision-makers methods to
achieve those visions.76
In order to imagine alternate configurations of
world order that better promote community values, the New Haven
School conceives of law as an authoritative and controlling process
of decision-making to address problems and to secure maximum
human dignity. So conceived, laws that do not secure compliance,
or which are not accompanied by expectations of compliance by
the world community to which they are addressed, do not
adequately describe the relevant legal system. Conversely, norms,
customs, or practices that lack formal legal pedigree but which are
either accompanied by expectations of compliance by the world
community or which in fact secure compliance may be studied as
part of the legal system.
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See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 119.

76

See MCDOUGAL & LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY,
supra note 22, at 38.
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In contrast, positivism conceives of law as a system
of rules, in which their legality turns on their formal legal pedigree
even if – as is the case in international law – this pedigree is often
unaccompanied by expectations of compliance. From the scholar’s
standpoint, these two concepts of law appear to be conceptually
incompatible.
Yet, the claim that the New Haven and positivist
concepts of law are conceptually incompatible is not really a
meaningful conceptual disagreement because the two concepts are
respectively predicated upon different pre-concept commitments.
Pre-concept commitments are ontological, normative, political or
social choices that must be made to develop or describe a concept.
These commitments or choices include: the function of inquiry; the
ideal type to observe; and the value of semantics. If two parties
disagree on any one of these pre-concept commitments, their
disagreements about conceptualizations of their respective objects
under inquiry may be meaningless.
Let me illustrate these points. Suppose that the
concept of a table is the subject of philosophical inquiry.
Philosopher A is interested in putting forth the best interpretation
of a table to enable carpenters to build dining tables, whereas
Philosopher B is interested in describing criteria for a table as it
exists in its various forms. A’s concept of a table may well specify
that tables must be large enough to seat at least two persons and
strong enough to bear the weight of china and silverware. B’s
concept of a table may specify that a table simply needs to be a
piece of furniture in which a flat surface is elevated about four feet
from the ground by one or more vertical legs. It is not possible for
A and B to meaningfully disagree on their concepts of a table
because their function of inquiries are different. They may
certainly debate their preferred purposes of philosophizing, but this
is not a conceptual debate.
Philosopher C enters into a debate with B. B’s ideal
type of a table is extrapolated from the salient characteristics
common among tables in his home. C, however, comes from a
different culture in which people sit cross legged on the floor and
designate as a table what we might ordinarily call a tray. C’s
concept of a table will be radically different than B’s concept
because their ideal types, or the representative data they observed
to conceptualize, are different. Again, to assert then that B and C
disagree about the concept of a table is not meaningful, because
they are simply speaking about different things.
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C leaves in a huff, and in comes D. D is a scientist
with aesthetic pretensions. He has invented a stable platform that
is suspended in the air by magnetic fields created by a machine
installed beneath floorboards. B, who is committed to the semantic
usage of the word “table” insists that the concept of a table cannot
be extrapolated from the floating platform because no one in the
community would use the word “table” in that way. D, however,
does not share the same commitment to semantic usage of words.
In his view, what matters more is whether the platform serves the
same function as a table. Because it is a stable flat surface parallel
to the ground on which a person could eat, read and write, the
concept of a table must include his platform.
The point here about disagreements over
commitments to the value of semantics is different from Dworkin’s
semantic sting argument. Dworkin argued that philosophers must
agree on roughly the same criteria for a concept denoted by a word
before they can have a meaningful disagreement on that concept.
So, according to Dworkin, if you do not count his copy of MOBY
DICK as a book because in your view novels are not books, “any
agreement is bound to be senseless” because you and Dworkin are
using the word “book” in completely different ways.77 Raz
disagrees with Dworkin. In Raz’s view, in the ordinary course of
human interaction, you would not insist that MOBY DICK is not a
book and you would apologize for your mistake.78 According to
Raz, “criterial explanations of concepts are consistent with the fact
that people who use the rules setting out these criteria may make
mistakes about which criteria are set by the rules.”79
Although Raz is correct that people can make
mistakes about semantic criteria without invalidating criterial
explanations, he seems to miss Dworkin’s point. If a person is
committed to different semantic criteria, then it is impossible to
engage in a meaningful disagreement with him about the concept
denoted by the word being used. Take for example, the word
“consideration.” A person committed to the semantics of its
ordinary usage may say the concept of consideration entails
deliberately thinking about an idea. A lawyer, who does not share
those semantics, but is committed to the specialized semantics of
77

See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 45.
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Joseph Raz, Two Views on the Nature of the Theory of Law, in HART’S
POSTSCRIPT, supra note 8, at 1, 17 (making the point with reference to a
disagreement about tables and sideboards).
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Id. at 1, 18-19.
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his profession, asserts that the concept of consideration is a
bargained for exchange of something of legal value. The lay
person and the lawyer may disagree about their concepts of
consideration, but they are speaking past each other.
In any event, the author’s point about the value of
semantics does not stand or fall on whether Dworkin or Raz is
correct, because it makes a slightly different point. My point is
that for there to be meaningful conceptual disagreement, the
disagreeing parties must share roughly the same pre-concept
commitment to the value of semantics in conceptualizing. Without
this commitment, a philosopher may determine a concept by the
functions ascribed to it by the community, rather than by its
ordinary semantic meaning of the word representing the concept.
This concept could be quite different from the concept shackled to
the semantic usage of the word representing the concept. So,
Philosopher D is not committed to semantics about how an object
appears, but instead focuses on how an object functions, so he
designates his platform as a table. B, who is committed to
semantics, does not believe the word table and its associated
concept includes platforms. Yet D and B cannot have a
meaningful conceptual disagreement. They could certainly have a
meaningful disagreement about semantic commitments, but this
would be anterior to conceptual debate.
We can now apply our discussion about pre-concept
commitments to the apparent conceptual incompatibility between
the New Haven School and positivists. I submit it is difficult for
New Haven jurists and positivists to engage each other about
conceptual differences because they disagree about all three preconcept commitments.
As regards the function of jurisprudence, the New
Haven School seeks to provide guidance to decision-makers about
what to do to authoritatively secure maximum human dignity.
International law positivists see the function of jurisprudence as
describing rules they designate as legal by reference to secondary
rules about the pedigree of prior decisions and sources of law.
Modern international law positivists explicitly eschew providing
guidance on policy, except in so far as the rule of recognition
incorporates policy into the criteria for legal validity. Not
surprisingly, the New Haven School conceptualizes law as the
process of decision-making, whereas positivists conceptualize law
as a body of rules.

30

© Tai-Heng Cheng. Draft of August 20, 2009.
Do Not Cite or Circulate.
As regards the ideal type of law, because the New
Haven School is committed to offering practical guidance to
decision-makers, it selects as its ideal type the entire global
decision-making process in which power and authority are diffused
rather than concentrated in elite law-makers, in which claims and
norms may be, to varying degrees authoritatively controlling, and
in which formal legal rules may not tell the whole story about the
actions and deliberations of relevant actors.80 In contrast,
international law positivists designate as their ideal type the
international legal norms concerning international relations that are
legally validated by reference to limited sources specified in an
international rule of recognition. With such different ideal types, it
is unavoidable that the New Haven School and positivists will
identify different salient characteristics of their respective concepts
of law.
As regards the value of semantics, it follows from
the New Haven School’s commitment to offering functional
guidance that it draws into its scope of inquiry factors that affect
international conduct, even if those factors would not in ordinary
usage be termed as law. Reisman has explained that
“[a]rrangements and processes which
may not have been assigned the
sobriquet, “international law,” by the
people who fashioned them; yet from
the perspective of the disengaged
observer, it will be apparent that
these processes and arrangements
functioned as the struts of world or
regional order in specific contexts.”81
This rejection of descriptive semantics in favor of functional
criteria is an anathema to positivists, who are committed to
describing those phenomena that ordinarily would fall within the
normal usage of the word “law.”
These normative disagreements as to the purpose of
jurisprudence, the ideal type of international law, and the relevance
of semantics cannot be properly addressed at the conceptual level.
80

See Reisman, McDougal’s Jurisprudence: Utility, Influence,
Controversy, supra note 5, at 274.
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Reisman, JOHNSTON Preface, supra note 24, at vii; see also generally
W. MICHAEL REISMAN, LAW IN BRIEF ENCOUNTERS (1999).
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The resultant differences between the New Haven School and
positivists respective concepts of law are accordingly not really
conceptual disagreements. They are, more fundamentally,
normative disagreements about pre-concept commitments.
V.

The Choice of Law

This Article has argued that although New Haven
and positivist concepts of law are different, this difference is not a
very meaningful conceptual dispute. The meaningful disagreement
is over pre-concept commitments that are not of a conceptual
nature, but of an ontological and normative nature.
It may be possible to bridge the apparent normative
gulf by recognizing the respective pre-concept commitments of the
New Haven School and positivists. It might even be possible to
have a meaningful conversation about law once jurists and scholars
accept that the word law can denote two often non-mutually
exclusive concepts, which I shall call Law1 and Law2.82 Law1
refers to the positivist concept of law, a body of legal rules derived
from secondary rules governing legal pedigree. Some scholars
have variously referred to this as a “legal regime,”83 or a “theory of
law.”84 Law2 refers to the New Haven concept of law, the process
of authoritative and controlling decisionmaking. Some scholars
have variously referred to this as a “legal order,”85 a “theory about
law,”86 or, “World Order.”87
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Janet Halley made a similar semantic move in explaining various
feminist theories. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS 23-25 (2006).
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Symposium, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order, 46 HARV.
INT’L L. J. 387, 387 (2005) (distinguishing between legal regime and
legal order).
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JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 113.
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See Symposium, Comparative Visions of Global Public Order, supra
note 83, at 387.
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See Reisman, Testing a Theory About Law, supra note 23, at 104;
JOHNSTON, supra note 10, at 113; see also Myres S. McDougal, Harold
D. Lasswell & W. Michael Reisman, Theories about International Law:
Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 VA. J. INT’L L. 188 (1968).

87
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With this distinction, it is possible for a positivist to
assert that there is a Law1 rule against preemptive military force
without claiming that this rule is also Law2, if the Law1 rule
slavishly applied to every situation may lead to a suboptimal policy
outcome for the world community. Conversely, a New Haven
jurist may assert that Law2 permits preemptive military force in
certain contexts in which such force would promote world order
and maximize human well-being, broadly speaking, while
accepting that a Law1 rule against preemptive force exists on the
books and entails a strong, albeit not necessarily overwhelming,
expectation of compliance.
The distinction between Law1 and Law2 can be
useful to legal advisors in foreign ministries as well. A legal
advisor with a policy bent may counsel her foreign minister that
Law1 prohibits preemptive force, but because the threat of
destruction from a particular putative enemy seeking nuclear
weapons is so great, her government should consider military
preemption from a Law2 perspective, even at the cost of flouting
the Law1 rule.
Alternatively, a legal advisor with a strict
positivist orientation may decide to advise his foreign minister of
the Law1 rule against preemptive force, and explicitly leave
considerations of Law2 to other policy advisors.
Differentiating between Law1 and Law2 also helps
to explain how a New Haven jurist performing a judicial function
can appraise a dispute before him under Law2, but nonetheless
recognize that he is bound in his role to decide the dispute in
accordance with Law1 and ultimately follow Law1. It is also
possible for a positivist sitting as a judge to recognize that the
applicable Law1 rules would lead to such a terrible outcome in
Law2 terms that it would unacceptably shock the conscience, and
as a result to issue a decision that departs from Law1 and explains
its reasons using Law2, as Dworkin and Reisman both
recommend.88
The problems of fragmentation of international law
and international legal theory are wider and deeper than the
disagreements between positivists and policy-oriented jurists. This
Article has demonstrated that apparent conceptual differences
between positivism and policy-oriented jurisprudence are more
rather than “THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.”
Johnston, supra note 10.
88
Supra, Part III.
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meaningfully understood as differences about normative and
ontological preconcept commitments. However, work remains to
be done to test whether disagreements among other concepts of
international law could also be understood and ameliorated by
studying their respective preconcept commitments. Then, a new
vocabulary– beyond Law1 and Law2 – could be constructed to
enable proponents of various theories to fully engage each other.
Difficult questions will also need to be addressed, such as how to
resolve conflicts about when jurists disagree about whether Law1,
Law2, Law3, Law4, … should prevail in an international problem.
These issues will need to be addressed in future
scholarly works. For now, the theoretical innovation of this Article
concerning preconcept commitments suggests that there may be a
fertile field of research in international legal philosophy that may
ultimately help develop international law and achieve its goals of
promoting human dignity and world order. If a concept of law is
contingent upon its pre-concept commitments, proponents of
different concepts of law may eventually find better ways to work
together – meaningfully agreeing and disagreeing with each other
– by being aware of their respective pre-concept commitments and
the extent to which they are not always mutually exclusive.
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